Key exchange protocols allow two or more parties communicating over a public network to establish a common secret key called a session key. Due to their significance in building a secure communication channel, a number of key exchange protocols have been suggested over the years for a variety of settings. Recently, Lo et al. proposed a three-party password-based authenticated key exchange (3PAKE) protocol, where two users, each shares a human-memorable password with a server, can generate a session key for future communication with the help of the server. They claimed that their scheme could resist various attacks. However, this work shows that Lo et al.'s protocol is vulnerable to an off-line password guessing attack. The analysis show Lo et al.'s protocols is not suitable for practical applications.
Introduction
Password-based authenticated key exchange (PAKE) protocol allows two or more parties authenticate each other and generate a strong session key through a shared humanmemorable password in an insecure channel. It has been widely used in people's life since passwords are able to be freely chosen and can be fairly easily memorized without any assistant storage device.
In 1992, Bellovin et al. [2] proposed the first two-party password-based authenticated key exchange (2PAKE) protocol. Since then, many 2PAKE protocols [1, 3, [8] [9] [10] 19] have been proposed. However, 2PAKE protocols are inconvenient and costly for use in large scale peer to peer systems. Since 2PAKE protocols require each pair of potential communicating parties to share a password, a large number of parties result in an even larger number of passwords to be shared. To solve the problem, Steiner et al. [17] proposed a three-party password-based authenticated key exchange (3PAKE) protocol. However, Ding et al. [6] pointed out that Steiner et al.'s protocol cannot resist the undetectable on-line password guessing attacks. Later, Lin et al. [11] also demonstrated that Steiner et al.'s protocol is vulnerable to t the off-line password guessing attacks. To improve security, Lin et al. also proposed an improved 3PAKE protocol using public key cryptosystem. However, Lin et al. protocol is inefficient owing to the heavy computation cost of public key cryptosystem. To improve performance, Lee et al. [14] presented two enhanced 3PAKE protocols without public key cryptosystem. Later, Wen et al. [18] proposed a 3PAKE protocol using Weil pairing. Unfortunately, Nam et al. [15] pointed out that Wen et al.'s protocol cannot resist the man-in-the-middle attack. To balance the tradeoff between security robustness and system efficiency, Lu et al. [13] proposed a simple 3PAKE protocol. There is no public key cryptosystem and symmetric cryptosystem are required. Lu et al. claimed that their protocol could resist various attacks. However, many researchers have shown that Lu et al.'s protocol suffers from man-in-the-middle attack and undetectable on-line password guessing attacks [4, 7, 16] . To improve security and performance efficiency on data computation and transmission round, Chang [5] proposed an improved 3PAKE protocol based on Lu et al.'s protocol. Recently, Lo et al. [12] demonstrated that Chang's protocol suffers from man-in-the-middle attack, undetectable on-line password guessing attacks, and off-line password guessing attacks. To improve security, Lo et 
Cryptanalysis of Lo et al.'s Protocol
In Lo et al.'s protocol, the user could choose his password freely. For convenience, he would like to choose a password can be remembered easily. However, the easy-toremember password is vulnerable to password guessing attacks. There are two types of the password guessing attack, i.e. the on-line password guessing attack and the offline password guessing attack. In the first one, the adversary tries to use guessed passwords iteratively to pass the verification in an on-line manner. Therefore, the attack could be thwarted by limiting the number of continuous login attempts within a short period. In the second one, the adversary intercepts some message transmitted between the user and the server and then iteratively guesses the user's password and verifies the correctness in an off-line manner. The attack is more dangerous than the first one since the server cannot find the attack. In this section, we will show Lo et al.'s protocol is vulnerable to the off-line password guessing attack.
We assume that an attacker C has total control over the communication channel among , AB and S , which means that he can insert, delete, or alter any messages in the channel. Then C could intercept the message { , , ( 
Conclusion
Recently, Lo et al. proposed a three-party password-based authenticated key exchange protocol and demonstrated its immunity against various attacks. However, after review of their protocol and analysis of its security, we show their protocol is venerable to the off-line password guessing attack. The analyses show that the protocol is insecure for practical application.
